

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 236355
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE: BNEWLIN:IW/CW
APPROVED BY EUR:JE GOODBY
EUR/NE - RLFUNSETH
S/S - DANDERSON
S:DANDERSON
-----003435 010925Z /21

P 010448Z OCT 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 236355

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, NE

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER
VAN DER STOEL SEPTEMBER 29, IN NEW YORK

1. SUMMARY. THE MEETING COVERED THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ENHANCED RADIATION BOMBS, NUCLEAR ISSUES INCLUDING URENCO AND INFCE, THE ILO AND AFRICA. END SUMMARY.
2. MIDDLE EAST. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARAB AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON A FORMULA FOR GENEVA AND ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY FLEXIBILITY ON EITHER SIDE.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WERE INCHING ALONG AND THERE WAS SOME FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS POSSIBLE THERE WOULD BE A
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 236355

CONFERENCE BY YEAR END. THOUGH PARTIES WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE, AND ITS STRUCTURE BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WERE ALSO BEING ADDRESSED IN CONCRETE TERMS. IT WAS UP TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO NEGOTIATE, BUT WE HAVE HAD SOME

GOOD TALKS WITH BOTH SIDES.

THE SECRETARY SAID ALL PARTIES AGREED THAT THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE A

UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION TO INCLUDE BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS. REGARDING PROCEDURE, THERE WERE TWO ISSUES:

--HOW TO DEFINE PALESTINIANS, AND
--HOW TO STRUCTURE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GET OVER THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF APPROACHES UNDER CONSIDERATION.

ON STRUCTURE, THERE WERE TWO BASIC THEORIES AND EVEN THE ARABS DISAGREED ON WHICH WAS PREFERABLE. ONE APPROACH WAS TO ORGANIZE THE CONFERENCE FUNCTIONALLY WITH ONE COMMITTEE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES, ONE FOR PEACE AND ONE FOR THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

UNDER A SECOND APPROACH THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE DIVIDED INTO QUESTIONS WHICH LENT THEMSELVES TO BILATERAL SOLUTIONS AND THOSE WHICH WERE ESSENTIALLY MULTILATERAL. FOR EXAMPLE THE QUESTION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WAS BILATERAL. THE QUESTION OF THE WEST BANK WOULD REQUIRE PARTICIPATION BY PALESTINIANS, JORDANIANS AND PERHAPS OTHERS. SIMILARLY, EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS REGARDING GAZA. A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED ALONG THESE LINES COULD HAVE BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUPS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 236355

TICIPATE IN THE TALKS REGARDING GAZA. A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED ALONG THESE LINES COULD HAVE BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUPS.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE PREFERRED THE SECOND APPROACH. THREE WORKING GROUPS ORGANIZED ALONG FUNCTIONAL LINES WOULD BE INEFFICIENT, WASTE TIME AND COMPLICATE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR ARABS OTHER THAN THE EGYPTIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE WIDTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN THE SINAI. SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE PALESTINIAN HOMELAND WOULD REQUIRE A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE PRAGMATIC. IN RESPONSE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THE ISRAELIS ALSO FAVOR THE BILATERAL-MULTILATERAL CONCEPT AND THAT EGYPT WANTS THE SINAI HANDLED IN BILATERAL TALKS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AN IMMEDIATE QUESTION WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION CONCERNING SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR POSITION WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE BEHAVING ILLEGALLY ON THE WEST BANK. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DUTCH DEPLORE ALL ASPECTS OF ISRAELI POLICY REGARDING THE OCCUPIED AREA.

NEVERTHELESS THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN THE EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION SUCH AS REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY. MOREOVER, ONE WOULD HAVE TO WATCH ANY ARAB AMENDMENTS CAREFULLY. THE SECRETARY SAID THE ISRAELI

POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS ALSO GAVE US PROBLEMS. EACH NEW SETTLEMENT MADE IT HARDER TO NEGOTIATE. HE HAD TALKED TO BEGIN ABOUT IT BUT DID NOT KNOW WHAT ISRAELIS WOULD DO. WE WOULD LOOK AT EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION VERY CAREFULLY.

3. ENHANCED RADIATION BOMBS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DUTCH WERE CONCERNED ABOUT ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS. THEIR VERY NAME -- NEUTRON BOMBS -- POSED PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. PEOPLE PERCEIVE THEM AS BOMBS THAT KILL PEOPLE
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 236355

AND SAVE BUILDINGS, AND WHILE THIS IS A SUPERFICIAL AND NOT REALISTIC CHARACTERIZATION, NONETHELESS IT IS AN IDEA THAT IS DIFFICULT TO DISPEL. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT RUSH INTO A POSITION ON DEPLOYMENT BUT CONTINUE OUR CONSULTATIONS COVERING POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS AS WELL AS MILITARY. THOUGH AN ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE FOR THE BOMB'S DEPLOYMENT ON MILITARY GROUNDS, THIS MIGHT REOPEN AN OLD AND DIVISIVE DEBATE AND PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE "BAN THE BOMB" MOVEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN RELATIVELY DORMANT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE BOMB WAS DESIGNED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SOVIET TANK SUPERIORITY BUT HE WONDERED IF THERE WERE NOT ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS SUCH AS IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT RUSHING INTO A DECISION.

THE SECRETARY SAID THESE COMMENTS STRUCK A SYMPATHETIC CHORD. THE QUESTION WAS A DISTURBING ONE FOR US AND HE ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RUSH INTO A DECISION. WE WELCOME FULL CONSULTATION AND VALUE THE ADVICE OF OUR ALLIES ON THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE. THE US DESIGNED THE WEAPON FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND IF THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT WANT IT WE WILL LET IT DROP. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IF THERE WAS A REAL DIVISION IN NATO ON THE ISSUE, WE WANTED TO HEAR ABOUT IT. WE HAVE NO WISH AT ALL TO TAKE ACTION NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE WISHES OF OUR ALLIES.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE OTHERS IN NATO WHO HAD THE SAME SORT OF RESERVATIONS AS THE DUTCH BUT WHO WERE NOT SPEAKING UP, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THEIR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCERNS.
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 236355

THE SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY EMPHASIZED OUR WISH THAT ANY IN THE ALLIANCE WITH RESERVATIONS ON ANY GROUNDS SHOULD MAKE THEM VERY CLEAR IN NATO.

4. NUCLEAR ISSUES: URENCO; INFCE

THE FOREIGN MINISTER RAISED THE ISSUE OF URENCO'S SUPPLYING ENRICHED URANIUM TO BRAZIL NOTING THAT THE US HAD TRIED TO PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN REPROCESSING PLANT. WHILE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, THE DUTCH NOW HAD TO OPERATE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PLANT WOULD BE BUILT. THEY WERE FACED, THUS, WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES.

-- THEY COULD WITHDRAW, IN WHICH EVENT THERE WOULD BE NO ADDITIONAL GUARANTEES ON SAFEGUARDS, OR

-- THEY COULD STAY IN THE PICTURE AND INSIST ON ADDITIONAL GUARANTEES AND SAFEGUARDS.

THEY HAD CHOSEN THE LATTER: UNDER THE SYSTEM THEY ENVISAGE THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WOULD CONTROL THE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM IN BRAZIL. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THE DUTCH SYSTEM WOULD PROVIDE FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR PREVENTIVE CONTROLS. IN ADDITION TO IAEA INSPECTION OF THE REPROCESSING PLANTS, THE IAEA WOULD HAVE PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER THE STORED PLUTONIUM AND WOULD RELEASE IT ONLY IF THE RESULTS OF THE CONTINUOUS INSPECTION OF THE PROCESSING PLANTS WAS SATISFACTORY. THERE WOULD THUS BE CONTINUOUS SAFEGUARDS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 236355

ANOTHER TWO MONTHS TO GET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SUCH A SYSTEM AND LONGER TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. IT WILL THEN REQUIRE APPROVAL OF THE IAEA BOARD. AT THAT POINT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HOPES THE US WILL NOT OPPOSE THE PLAN. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE OPERATING OF THE PLUTONIUM STORAGE FACILITIES BY THE IAEA PROVIDES ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS.

THE SECRETARY ASKED IF URENCO WOULD BE ENTERING ANY NEW CONTRACTS BEFORE THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP HAD MADE A DETERMINATION ON FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY NEW CONTRACTS TO NON-NPT COUNTRIES OR TO COUNTRIES THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED DANGEROUS. REGARDING COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SIGNED THE NPT AND WHERE THERE

--
WERE NO PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, HE BELIEVED THE ANSWER

WOULD STILL BE NO.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THEY WOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION (INFCE). THE DUTCH, AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE EC, SHARE THE US CONCERNS. HE NOTED THAT WHILE THE STUDY WAS TECHNICAL, ITS BACKGROUND WAS POLITICAL, IT HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, AND IT SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE. THE SECRETARY AGREED. HE WELCOMED THE DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY WHICH COULD PROVIDE ANSWERS TO NOW UNANSWERED QUESTIONS.

5. ILO

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 236355

THE SECRETARY SAID NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ON THE ILO QUESTION. BOTH US BUSINESS AND LABOR HAD VOTED TO WITHDRAW BUT THE PRESIDENT, WHO MUST MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION, HAD NOT YET DECIDED. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE EC POSITION. THEIR COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THEIR RESOLVE TO OVERCOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE AS MUCH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A DECISION THAT WENT AGAINST BOTH THE BUSINESS AND LABOR COMMUNITIES. HE PERSONALLY FAVORED REMAINING IN THE ILO AND EXTENDING OUR MEMBERSHIP FOR ANOTHER YEAR. THE VAST MAJORITY OF US OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, WANTED OUT. HE THOUGHT WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS ON A WIDE SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH DID NOT REFLECT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW AND AGREED SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FAR BEYOND THE ILO. HE WILL BEAR IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT.

6. AFRICA

THE SECRETARY THANKED THE DUTCH FOR THEIR SUPPORT ON RHODESIA. THEIR CONTACTS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE HELPED. MOST COUNTRIES WISH TO SEE THAT THE PRESENT INITIATIVE GETS A FAIR TRIAL. HE FOUND THE DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 28 RELATIVELY POSITIVE. NKOMO TOOK A RELATIVELY MODERATE LINE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE FULLY SHARES OUR AIMS AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO HELP WITH CONTACT WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE UN.

7. INVITATION FOR THE SECRETARY TO THE NETHERLANDS

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 236355

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
FOR THE SECRETARY TO VISIT THE NETHERLANDS DURING 1978.

8. PARTICIPANTS, IN ADDITION TO THE SECRETARY AND THE
FOREIGN MINISTER WERE:

DUTCH: AMBASSADOR TO THE US-BAKKER;
UN PERM REP: KAUFMANN;
POLITICAL DIRECTOR RUTTEN.

US: ASST. SECRETARY VEST;
EUR/NE DIRECTOR FUNSETH, AND
BENELUX DESK OFFICER NEWLIN. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 01-Oct-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE236355
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/NE: BNEWLIN:IW/CW
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770358-0664
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197710108/baaaetwn.tel
Line Count: 292
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8998c924-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 753274
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL SEPTEMBER 29, IN NEW YORK
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, NE, US, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (VAN DER STOEL, MAX)
To: THE HAGUE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8998c924-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009